RECENT CASES
Evidence-Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Accident to Prove Dangerous
Condition-[innesota].-Plaintiff sued for damages sustained when she fell on defendant's waxed linoleum floor, which had become wet and slippery. The trial court
excluded evidence of another person's fall in nearly the same spot fifteen minutes later.
Held, the exclusion was error. The subsequent accident may be used to show the dangerous condition of the floor. Taylor v. Northern States Power Co., 256 N.W. 674 (Minn.
1934).

The use of similar accidents as evidence of a dangerous condition presupposes a case
where it is not obvious that the condition is dangerous, for if it is obvious, the evidence
will be excluded because it is unnecessary, even though it may be relevant and of high
probative value. There is a split of judicial authority on the question of using similar
accidents as evidence. See 65 A.L.R. 380. The conflict is traceable to three sources:
(i) The case of Collins v. Dorchester,6o Mass. 396 (185o), established an absolute
rule of exclusion, instead of leaving the matter open for the court to decide whether, in
various situations, the probative value of the evidence was disproportionate to any
prejudice it might cause. Twenty-two years later a contrary trend was started by
Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 4o1 (1872), which repudiated the Massachusetts
rule of absolute exclusion. However, the influence of Collins v. Dorchesteris still alive.
See i Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), § 458. In Mathews v. City of Cedar Rapids, 8o
Iowa 459, 45 N.W. 894 (i8go), for example, the court decried the precedent it felt itself
obliged to follow. A reason sometimes given for the exclusion is that evidence of other
accidents will raise collateral issues which the defendant is not prepared to meet.
Temperance Hall Ass'n v. Giles, 33 N.J. L. 260, (1869); Hoyt v. Des Moines, 76 Iowa
430, 41 N.W. 63 (1888); McKelvey, Evidence (4 th ed. 1932), 196. But the argument
that collateral issues are raised has not been considered especially persuasive. Quinlan
v. City of Utica, ri Hun (N.Y.) 217 (1877), aff'd in 74 N.Y. 603 (1878). And the ob-

jection of surprise can be urged no more strongly here than against almost any other
type of evidence. A defendant should be prepared to meet any proof of his negligence.
i Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), § 443.
(2) A second source of the conflict in the cases on this point lies in the failure of
courts to distinguish clearly between the two uses of such evidence. It is important to
note that evidence of similar accidents may be used to prove (a) existence of a dangerous condition: Scott v. New Orleans, 75 Fed. 373 (C.C.A. 5th 1896); or (b) notice:
Yates v. Covinglon, 119 Ky. 228, 83 S.W. 592 (1904). Some courts, see Aaronson v.

New Haven, 94 Conn. 69o, 1io Atl. 872 (1920), mention a third use-actionable negligence; but it is difficult to see what they mean since the only actionable negligence
there can be must arise either from the creation of a dangerous condition or from notice.
(3)Courts tend to use the ambiguous term "other accidents," not specifying whether they were prior or subsequent, or the use to which the evidence of "other accidents"
is to be put. This leads to confusion, since a subsequent accident could not be used to
prove notice of a dangerous condition. See Districtof Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519
(1882); Nye v. Dibley, 88 Minn. 465, 93 N.W. 524 (1903).
A majority of courts now admit evidence of accidents prior to the one actually being
sued for, to prove the existence of a dangerous condition. But there is less agreement
on the use of subsequent accidents to prove the same thing. See McGrailv. Kalamazoo,
94 Mich. 52, 53 N.W. 955 (1892); 65 A.L.R. 380.
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It is submitted that whether the similar accident occurred before or after the one in
suit should be immaterial, if the similar accident is being used to prove a dangerous
condition. Cook v. New Durham, 64 N.H. 419, 13 AUt. 65o (1887); Masters v. Troy, 50
Hun (N.Y.) 485 (1888), aff'd in 323 N.Y. 628, 25 N.E. 952 (189o); Freidman v. New
York, 63 Misc. 310, ii6 N.Y.S. 750 (1909); but see Davis v. Alexander City, 137 Ala.
206, 33 So. 863 (1902). In any event, however, it must of course appear that both the
main and the similar accident occurred under substantially the same conditions.
Griffith v. Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132 Pac. 57 (1913); City of Aurora v. Plummer, 122 Inl.
App. 143 (i9o5). See Gillriev. Lockport, 122 N.Y. 403, 25 N.E. 357 (189o), where, in an
action against a town for injuries sustained by slipping on a defective sidewalk, evidence that another person slipped at the same place two years before was held inadmissible for any purpose, since it was not shown that the earlier accident was caused
by a defect in the sidewalk. The instant case undoubtedly reached a sound result.
The subsequent accident was of considerable probative value in showing the dangerous
condition of the floor. Moreover, the subsequent accident was shown to have occurred
only fifteen minutes after the main one, and while conditions were practically the same
Federal Procedure-Review of Order to Remand-[United States].-Plaintiff, a
citizen of Texas, brought suit in a Texas state court against two contractors and the
city of Waco, Texas, for damages caused by a street obstruction. The city, under the
Texas practice, vouched in a surety company by cross-action. The surety company, a
Maryland corporation, removed the entire suit to the federal district court on the
ground of diversity of citizenship, asserting that a separable controversy existed as to
it. On plaintiff's motion to dismiss the cross-action and remand, the district court
held that the controversy was separable, and over-ruled the motion to remand; that
the surety company was an unnecessary party to plaintiff's suit and granted the motion to dismiss the cross-suit; and that the cross-suit having been dismissed, there no
longer was any diversity of citizenship to give the federal court jurisdiction, and remanded the suit to the state court. The city appealed the dismissal order, but the
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court's dismissal could not be reviewed, since an order to remand is not reviewable. City of Waco,
Texas, v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 67 F. (2d) 785 (C.C.A. 5th 1933).
The Supreme Court held: the order of dismissal, if not reviewed, is conclusive on the
city's rights. Hence, even though the order to remand is not reviewable the Circuit
Court of Appeals erred in not passing on the merits of the dismissal. Waco v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934).
The Supreme Court reasoned that while the action can no longer be tried as a unit
in the federal court, still, the entire action can be tried by the state court if the dismissal order is overruled. The Circuit Court of Appeals evidently felt the same result
was reached by its decision since it states that both the cross-action and the main suit
were pending in the state court, and the dismissal of the cross-action would not be res
adjudicata.
Since the passage of § 28 of the Judicial Code (36 Stat. 1094 (IgII), 28 U.S.C.A.,
§ 71 (1927)) providing that no appeal or writ of error will be allowed from an order or
remand, only once has a federal court negatived such an order. Travelers' Protective
Assn. v. Smith, 71 F. (2d) 511 (C.C.A. 4 th 1934). There, after the defendant had
properly removed the case to the federal court, the plaintiff remitted all damages over

